We consider the relation between Sion's minimax theorem for a continuous function and a Nash equilibrium in a five-players game with two groups which is zero-sum and symmetric in each group. We will show the following results.
Introduction
We consider the relation between Sion's minimax theorem for a continuous function and existence of a Nash equilibrium in a five-players game with two groups which is zero-sum and symmetric in each group. There are five players, A, B, C, D and E. Players A, B and E are in one group, and Players C and D are in the other group. Players A, B and E have the same payoff functions and strategy spaces, and they play a game which is zero-sum in this group, that is, the sum of the payoffs of Players A, B and E is zero. Similarly, Players C and D have the same payoff functions and strategy spaces, and they play a game which is zero-sum in this group, that is, the sum of the payoffs of Players C and D is zero.
We will show the following results.
1. The existence of Nash equilibrium which is symmetric in each group implies Sion's minimax theorem for a pair of playes in each group.
2. Sion's minimax theorem for a pair of playes in each group imply the existence of a Nash equilibrium which is symmetric in each group.
Thus, they are equivalent. The coincidence of the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy is assumed in Assumption ??
An example of such a game is a relative profit maximization game in each group under oligopoly with two groups such that firms in each group have the same cost functions and maximize their relative profits in each group, and the demand functions are symmetric for the firms in each group. Consider a five firms oligopoly. Letπ A ,π B ,π C ,π D andπ E be the absolute profits of, respectively, Firms A, B, C, D and E. Then, the relative profits of Firms A, B and E are
The relative profits of Firms C and D are
π C + π D = 0. Firms A, B, C, D and E maximize, respectively, π A , π B , π C , π D and π E . Thus, the relative profit maximization game in each group is a zero-sum game1. In Section 4 we present an example of relative profit maximization in each group under oligopoly with two groups. In that example we assume that the demand functions for Firms A, B and E are symmetric, those for Firm C and are symmetric, Firms A, B and E have the same cost function, and Firms C and D have the same cost function.
The model and Sion's minimax theorem
Consider a five-players game with two groups. The game is zero-sum in each group. There are five players, A, B, C, D and E. The strategic variables for Players A, B, C, D and E are, respectively, s A , s B , s C , s D , s E , and (
S C , S D , S E are convex and compact sets in linear topological spaces. The payoff function of each player is u i (s A , s B , s C , s D , s E ), i = A, B, C, D, E. They are real valued functions on S A × S B × S C × S D × S E . We assume u A , u B , u C , u D and u E are continuous on S A × S B × S C × S D × S E , quasi-concave on S i for each s j ∈ S j , j i, and quasi-convex on S j for j i for each s i ∈ S i , i = A, B, C, D, E, and S A = S B = S E , and S C = S D .
There are two groups. Players A, B and E are in one group, and Players C and D are in the other group. The game is symmetric for the players in each group in the sense that Players A, B and E have the same payoff functions and strategy spaces, and Players C and D have the same payoff functions and strategy spaces. The game is zero-sum in each group. Therefore,
Sion's minimax theorem (Sion (1958) , Komiya (1988) , Kindler (2005) ) for a continuous function is stated as follows. We follow the description of this theorem in Kindler (2005) . Let s C , s D and s E be given. Then, u A (s A , s B , s C , s D , s E ) is a function of s A and s B . We can apply Lemma 1 to such a situation, and get the following equation.
By symmetry we require
However, we do not require
nor max
Similarly, given s A , s B and s E we get max
We do not require
We assume that arg max
By the maximum theorem they are continuous. Also, throughout this paper we assume that the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy of players in any situation are unique, and the best responses of players in any situation are unique. Let us consider a point such that s A = s B = s E = s and s C = s D = s ′ , and consider the following function.
.
Since u A and u C are continuous, S A = S B = S E are compact and S C = S D are compact, these functions are also continuous. Thus, there exists a fixed point of (s, s ′ ). Denote it by (s,ŝ). It satisfiess = arg max
By symmetry we gets = arg max
However we do not requires
The main results
Consider a Nash equilibrium which is symmetric in each group. Let 
By the assumption of uniqueness of the best responses, they are unique. By symmetry for each group arg max
arg max
Therefore, 
= min 
With (7) and (8) 
By symmetry for each group
and so on. (7), (8), (9) and (10) 
From min
and max 
we get arg min
Therefore, arg max
By symmetry for each group we get arg max
and so on.
Next we show the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Sion's minimax theorem with the coincidence of the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy imply the existence of a Nash equilibrium which is symmetric in each group.
Proof. Lets andŝ be the values of s i , i = A, B, C, D, E such that
and max
we obtain arg max
By symmetry we get We assume that Firm A (or B or E) maximizes its profit relatively to the profit of Firm B and E (or A and E, or A and B) , and Firm C (or D) maximizes its profit relatively to the profit of Firm D (or C). Note that
Thus, this is a model of zero-sum game in each group with two groups.
Under the assumption of Cournot type behavior, the equilibrium outputs are Those between Firms A and E and so on are similarly defined. In our example we obtain arg max and so on. They are the same as Nash equilibrium strategies.
Concluding Remark
In this paper we have examined the relation between Sion's minimax theorem for a continuous function and a Nash equilibrium in . We want to extend this result to more general multi-players game.
